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Abstract
This letter investigates the artificial noise aided beamforming design for secure simultaneous wireless information
and power transfer (SWIPT) in a two-tier downlink heterogeneous network, where one femtocell is overlaid with one
macrocell in co-channel deployment. Each energy receiver (ER) in femtocell can be considered as a potential eaves-
dropper for messages intended for information receiver (IR). Our objective is to maximize the secrecy rate at IR subject
to the signal-to-interference-plus noise ratio (SINR) requirements of macro users (MUs), transmit power constraint and
energy harvesting constraint. Due to the non-convexity of the formulated problem, it cannot be solved directly. Thus,
we propose a novel reformulation by using first-order Taylor expansion and successive convex approximation (SCA)
techniques. Furthermore, an SCA-based algorithm with low complexity is proposed to arrive at provably convergent
solution. Finally, numerical results evaluate the performance of the proposed algorithm.
Index Terms
Heterogeneous networks, SWIPT, secrecy rate, successive convex approximation, second-order cone programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
To provide higher data rate for 5G wireless communications, heterogeneous network (HetNet) is emerging as a
promising network densification architecture and has been hailed as a key solution [1]. In HetNets, smallcells (e.g.,
picocells and femtocells) are deployed within the coverage of a macrocell and are operated in the same spectrum,
the challenge is the resulting cross-tier interference. On the other hand, simultaneous wireless information and power
transfer (SWIPT) has been envisioned as an attractive technique for powering energy-constrained wireless networks
[2]. Benefiting from the deployment of smallcells, the energy harvesting (EH) from serving base station (BS) is more
efficient due to the short access distance. In the context of HetNets with SWIPT, related works were presented in [3],
[4].
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2Since HetNet creates a multi-tier dynamic topology and thus its information security is critical. Responding to this,
physical layer security (PLS) [5], as an alternative to traditional cryptographic techniques, has been introduced into
the HetNets to realize secure communications [6]–[8]. Facing SWIPT-enabled HetNets, information security is more
critical due to the inherent openness of the multi-tier topology and the increased signal power for EH make information
particularly vulnerable to be eavesdropped by the unsubscribed energy receivers (ERs) (ER has better channel than
information receiver (IR)). In addition, the complicated network architectures and the cross-tier interference make it
much more challenging to realize PLS for SWIPT-enabled HetNets than that for SWIPT in a conventional single-tier
cellular network. To the best of our knowledge, by far little literature has investigated the secure beamforming in
SWIPT-enabled HetNets.
In this letter, we consider a promising application of SWIPT to a two-tier HetNet (e.g., device-to-device (D2D) and
machine-to-machine (M2M)), where it consists of a macrocell with multiple MUs and a femtocell with one IR as well
as multiple ERs. However, due to the broadcast nature of wireless channels, one critical issue arises that the messages
sent to IR may be eavesdropped by ERs. To enhance secure transmission, the artificial noise (AN) is embedded at the
intended signal to deteriorate the reception of ERs. Our goal is to maximize the secrecy rate at IR while satisfying
the required constraints. Particularly, our main contributions is summarized as follows:
• In the SWIPT-enabled HetNet, femtocell base station (FBS) shares downlink spectral resource with the macrocell
base station (MBS), and the mutual interference between these two networks is taken into account. Based on this
framework, we exploit co-channel interference as a useful resource to improve the secrecy rate of IR and energy
harvesting at ERs.
• With the non-convexity of the original optimization proplem, we propose a fresh perspective to reformulate it
as a series of second-order cone (SOC) inequalities, which circumvents the rank-one constraint in the existing
semidefinite relaxation (SDR) techniques. A successive convex approximation (SCA)-based iterative algorithm is
proposed and achieve low-complexity.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a downlink two-tier HetNet where a FBS deploys with a MBS, as shown in Fig. 1. The FBS serves
K + 1 femtocell users (FUs) and shares certain spectral resources as MBS serving M MUs to improve the spectrum
efficiency. The MBS and FBS are equipped with NM ≥M and NF ≥ K +1 transmit antennas, respectively, whereas
each MU and FU are equipped with a single receive antenna. We assume that FBS is capable of performing wireless
power transfer and exists two types of FUs in the femtocell, i.e., one IR and K ERs. Following the mechanism of [9],
the separate IR and ER are adopted. Since the ERs may be malicious, they eavesdrop the information signal intended
for IR. Thus, the ERs as potential eavesdroppers should be taken into account. Let M = {1, . . . ,M} denote the set
of MUs and K = {1, . . . ,K} denote the set of ERs. For notational simplicity, we assume that the m-th MU in the
macrocell and the k-th ER in the femtocell are denoted by MUm and ERk, respectively.
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Fig. 1. System model of a two-tier HetNet supporting SWIPT.
The channel coefficients from MBS to MUm, IR, and ERk are denoted by hm ∈ C
NM×1, hI,0 ∈ C
NM×1, and
gk,0 ∈ C
NM×1, respectively. Likewise, the channel coefficients from FBS to IR, ERk, and MUm are denoted by
hI ∈ C
NF×1, gk ∈ C
NF×1 and lm ∈ C
NF×1, respectively. All channels undergo flat-fading including large-scale
fading, small-scale fading, and shadow fading. Note that each ER is also a communication node in the same network
which is assumed to be legitimate, active but do not have access to the information transmitted from MBS and FBS
to IR. Full CSI of all receivers is assumed to be available at MBS and FBS. In practice, those CSI can be estimated
via training and analog feedback [4], [5].
To support secure communication and facilitate EH at ERs, an AN aided beamforming scheme is employed at
FBS. Therefore, the transmitted signal vector is denoted by x = wIsI + vE, where sI ∼ CN (0, 1) and wI denote
the data symbol and beamforming vector, respectively. Hence, wIsI carries the confidential information intended for
IR. vE ∼ CN (0,VE) denotes the energy-carrying AN vector invoked by FBS, where VE represents the transmit
covariance matrices of vE.
Suppose sm ∼ CN (0, 1) is the data symbol transmitted by MBS intended for MUm and wm is the corresponding
beamforming vector, the signal received at MUm by considering the co-channel interference can be expressed as
ym = h
H
mwmsm +
M∑
i=1,i 6=m
hHmwisi + l
H
mx+ nm, (1)
where nm ∼ CN (0, σ
2
m) denotes the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at MUm. Then, the SINR at MUm can
be represented as
SINRm =
|hHmwm|
2∑M
i=1,i 6=m |h
H
mwi|
2 + |lHmwI|
2 + lHmVElm + σ
2
m
(2)
Since FBS desires to send the information-bearing signal x to IR while keeping it secret from ERs (suppose that it
is an eavesdropper to decode the message for IR instead of harvesting energy), the signals received by both IR and
ERk can be expressed, respectively, as
SINRI =
|hHI wI|
2∑M
m=1 |h
H
I,0wm|
2 + hHI VEhI + σ
2
I
, (3)
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4SINRe,k =
|gHk wI|
2∑M
m=1 |g
H
k,0wm|
2 + gHk VEgk + σ
2
e,k
, (4)
where σ2I and σ
2
e,k denote the variances of AWGN at IR and ERk, respectively. As seen from (3) and (4), the IR
and ERs suffer from the inter-tier interference in addition to intra-tier interference. It is necessary to jointly design
the beamformers at MBS and FBS in order to suppress the inter-cell interference resulting from aggressive frequency
reuse.
Then, the total transmit power of the whole network is given by
Ptot =
M∑
m=1
‖wm‖
2 + ‖wI‖
2 +Tr(VE) (5)
On the other hand, based on the energy harvesting model [4], [9], the harvested energy at ERk is written as
Ek = ξ
(
|gHk wI|
2 + gHk VEgk + σ
2
e,k
)
(6)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1] is the energy conversion efficiency that accounts for the loss converting the signal power to circuit
power. It should be pointed out that the ERk is very difficult to harvest energy from MBS due to the long-distance
transmission and poor wireless link. Thus, the contribution of
∑M
m=1 |g
H
k,0wm|
2 to EH is neglected here.
As such, the achievable instantaneous secrecy rate is formulated as
Rsec =
[
log2(1 + SINRI)−max
k∈K
log2(1 + SINRe,k)
]+
(7)
where the notation [x]+ = max{x, 0} is used.
Since FBS and MBS share the same radio resource, existing co-channel interference may degrade the data rate of
both the IR and ERs, as well as it is beneficial for ERs to harvest energy from the inter-tier interference. Therefore,
it is very nontrivial to properly designed secure beamforming and AN vectors to degrade the channels of ERs while
having a minimal effect on IR. Under such scenario, our objective is to seek the beamforming vectors wm, wI, and
AN covariance matrix VE to maximize the secrecy rate at IR, while satisfying the SINR requirement for each MU,
the total transmit power and EH constraints. Hence, the optimization problem is formulated as
max
wm,wI,vE
Rsec (8a)
s.t. SINRm ≥ Γm, ∀m ∈M, (8b)
Ptot ≤ Pth, (8c)
Ek ≥ Qk, ∀k ∈ K, (8d)
where Γm is the prescribed target SINR of MUm, Pth is the maximum transmit power threshold and Qk denotes the
prescribed EH threshold at ERk, respectively. It is clear that Problem (8) is non-convex, since the objective function
constitutes a difference of two convex functions programming problem, which is hard to optimally solve due to
prohibitively high computational complexity. For practical purposes, we propose an SCA-based iterative algorithm to
suboptimally solve Problem (8).
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5III. SECURE BEAMFORMING DESIGN
In this section, we develop a suboptimal algorithm based on second-order cone programming (SOCP) relaxation
for Problem (8) to circumvent the rank-one constraint and achieve a low-complexity. By introducing real-valued slack
variables γ, γI and γE, we rewrite Problem (8) equivalently as
max
γ,γI,γE,wm,wI,vE
γ (9a)
s.t. log2(1 + γI)− log2(1 + γE) ≥ γ, (9b)
SINRI ≥ γI, (9c)
SINRe,k ≤ γE, (9d)
SINRm ≥ Γm, (9e)
Ptot ≤ Pth, (9f)
Ek ≥ Qk, ∀m ∈ M, ∀k ∈ K. (9g)
Note that Problem (9) is non-convex due to the coupled variables in constraints (9b)-(9d) and (9g). To circumvent
this predicament, we apply Taylor series expansion and SCA techniques [10] to reformulate the original problem as
an SOCP.
Transformation of constraint (9c): We first give the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The hyperbolic constraint z2 ≤ xy is equivalent to
∥∥[2z, x− y]T∥∥ ≤ x+ y when x ≥ 0 and y ≥ 0.
To make Problem (9) easier to tackle, we commence note that (9c) can be equivalently transformed into
|hHI wI|
2 ≥ sI, (10a)
|hHI,0wm| ≤ sm, |h
H
I vE| ≤ sE, (10b)
sI∑M
m=1 s
2
m + s
2
E + σ
2
I
≥ γI, (10c)
where sI, sm and sE are the introduced real-valued slack variables. Clearly, (10b) is a convex constraint and (10a) is
a non-convex constraint since the left side is a quadratic function. To deal with (10a), we apply the first-order Taylor
series expansion on w˜I, we approximate the left side of (10a) as
|hHI wI|
2 = 2Re{w˜HI HIwI} − w˜
H
I HIw˜I (11)
With (11), (10a) becomes the following linear inequality
2Re{w˜HI HIwI} − w˜
H
I HIw˜I ≥ sI (12)
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6Now, we pay our attention to constraint (10c). By introducing real-valued slack variables µI and ηI, we further
transform constraint (10c) as
sI ≥ µ
2
I ,
M∑
m=1
s2m + s
2
E + σ
2
I ≤ ηI, (13a)
µ2I
ηI
≥ γI. (13b)
By applying Lemma 1, (13a) can be expressed as
∥∥[2µI, sI − 1]T∥∥2 ≤ sI + 1, (14)
∥∥[2s1, · · · , 2sM , 2sE, 2σI, ηI − 1]T∥∥2 ≤ ηI + 1. (15)
Recall that (13b), we remark that the right side is an affine function and the left side is a quadratic-over-affine
function. According to the convexity of µ2I /ηI, applying first-order Taylor expansion on (µ˜I, η˜I), we have [11]
2
(
µ˜I
η˜I
)
µI −
(
µ˜I
η˜I
)2
ηI ≥ γI (16)
Transformation of constraint (9d): In the same spirit, we split constraint (9d) into
|gHk wI| ≤ tk, (17a)
|gHk,0wm|
2 ≥ tk,0, |g
H
k vE|
2 ≥ te,k, (17b)
t2k∑M
m=1 tk,0 + te,k + σ
2
e,k
≤ γE, (17c)
where tk, tk,0, and te,k are newly introduced real-valued slack variables. Clearly, (17a) is a convex constraint. Similar
to (10a), the two terms in (17b) approximate as
2Re
{
w˜HmGk,0wm
}
− w˜HmGk,0w˜m ≥ tk,0,
2Re
{
v˜HE GkvE
}
− v˜HE Gkv˜E ≥ te,k. (18)
We can easily see that (17c) is convex constraint. Let bk =
∑M
m=1 tk,0 + te,k + σ
2
I , according to Lemma 1, (17c)
can be equivalently transformed into the following linear form
∥∥[2tk, γE − bk]T∥∥2 ≤ γE + bk (19)
Transformation of constraint (9e): We note that constraint (9e) can be rewritten as
M∑
i=1,i6=m
wHi Hmwi + (wI + vE)
HLm(wI + vE) + σ
2
m ≤
wHmHmwm
Γm
(20)
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7In light of [6], (20) can be transformed into the following SOC representation
∥∥∥[2wH1 hm, . . . , 2wHi hm, 2wHi+1hm, . . . , 2(wI + vE)H lm, 2σm,
(
Re(wHmhm)/
√
Γm
)
− 1]T
∥∥∥
2
≤
(
Re(wHmhm)/
√
Γm
)
+ 1,
Im(wHmhm) = 0, ∀m ∈ M. (21)
Transformation of constraint (9g): Next, we focus on non-convex constraint (9g). Similarly, (9g) can be transformed
into convex form
ξ[2Re{(w˜I + v˜E)
HGk(wI + vE)} − (w˜I + v˜E)
HGk(w˜I + v˜E) + σ
2
e,k] ≥ Qk (22)
Transformation of constraint (9b): Eventually, we return our attention to constraint (9b). Since (9b) is the difference
of two concave functions, it is non-convex. By introducing slack variable c and performing first-order Taylor series
expansion around point γ˜E, (9b) is rewritten as
1 + γI ≥ 2
c, (23)
c− log2(1 + γ˜E)−
γE − γ˜E
1 + γ˜E
≥ γ. (24)
Although the exponential cone in (23) can be solved by existing nonlinear solvers (e.g. MOSEK and Fmincon), it
requires more computation time in general. To further reduce the computational complexity, according to a result in
[11], (23) can be approximated in terms of a series of conic constraints as
τ0 ≤ 1 + γI,
‖[2 + c/2q−1, 1− τ1]‖2 ≤ 1 + τ1,
‖[5/3 + c/2q, 1− τ2]‖2 ≤ 1 + τ2,
‖[2τ1, 1− τ3]‖2 ≤ 1 + τ3,
τ2 + τ3/24 + 19/72 ≤ τ4,
‖[2τj−1, 1− τq]‖2 ≤ 1 + τj, j ∈ {5, . . . , q + 3}
‖[2τq+3, 1− τ0]‖2 ≤ 1 + τ0, (25)
where τj,∀j = (0, 1, . . . , q + 3), are the introduced slack variables, and the accuracy of the approximation increases
as q increases.
Based on the above discussions, the approximated version of Problem (9) is given by
max
wm,wI,vE,γ,γI,γE,sI
sm,sE,µI,ηI,tk,tk,0,te,k,c,τj
γI − γE
s.t. (9f ), (10b), (12), (14), (15), (16), (17a),
(18), (19), (21), (22), (24), and (25). (26)
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8Note that Problem (26) is a convex SOCP problem, which can be efficiently solved by using existing solvers, e.g.,
CVX [12]. The detailed procedure is summarized in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Iterative Algorithm for Solving Problem (26)
Input: Set n = 0, initialize w˜
(0)
m , w˜
(0)
I , v˜
(0)
E , µ˜
(0)
I , η˜
(0)
I , γ˜
(0)
E as the values which are feasible to Problem (26).
Step 1: Solve the convex Problem (26) with (w˜
(n)
m , w˜
(n)
I , v˜
(n)
E , µ˜
(n)
I , η˜
(n)
I , γ˜
(n)
E ) and obtain the optimal values (w
∗
m,
w∗I , v
∗
E, µ
∗
I , η
∗
I , γ
∗
E).
Step 2: Update (w˜
(n+1)
m , w˜
(n+1)
I , v˜
(n+1)
E , µ˜
(n+1)
I , η˜
(n+1)
I , γ˜
(n+1)
E )=(w
∗
m, w
∗
I , v
∗
E, µ
∗
I , η
∗
I , γ
∗
E).
n = n+ 1;
Output: wm and wI.
Convergence Analysis: From the above approximates, we can readily see that Problem (26) is convex, the optimal
solutions can be obtained by solving (26) for a given (w˜m, w˜I, v˜E, µ˜I, η˜I, γ˜E) in the n-th iteration. Based on the update
step in algorithm 1 (i.e., Step 2), the solutions in the n-th iteration are the feasible solutions in the (n+1)-th iteration.
This implies that the object value obtained in the (n+1)-th iteration is larger than or equal to that in the n-th iteration.
In other words, the secrecy rate in nondecreasing after each iteration. Furthermore, due to the power constraint, the
secrecy rate is bounded. This conclusion illustrates the convergence behavior of the proposed algorithm.
Complexity: According to [6], [11], the main computational complexity for solving Problem (26) based on the
proposed algorithm is L1 · O{NMM
3.5 +N3MM
2.5 +NF(K + 1)
3.5 +N3F(K +1)
2.5 + (q +7)3} log2(1/ǫ), where L1
is the number of iterations and ǫ is the accuracy requirement.
Remark 1: Our framework can be easily extended to the scenario consisting of one macrocell and multiple femtocells,
where the cooperation amongst multiple FBSs is necessary to enhance the secrecy performance of the intended IR.
The resultant optimization problem has to consider different kinds of constraints with respect to the receivers and
transmitters. The process of solving it is similar to the proposed algorithm.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, numerical results are provided to show the performance of the proposed scheme. The parameters are
set as NM = 10, NF = 4, M = 2 and K = 2, respectively. In the considered propagation environment, the channel
model adopted is given by [13]
hi =
√
β(di) · ψi · ϕ · h˜i, gk =
√
β(dk) · ψk · ϕ · g˜k, (27)
where β(d) denotes the large scale fading coefficient given as β(d) = 10−(128.1+37.6 log10(d))/10 and d represents the
propagation distance. ψi and ψk represent the log-normal shadow fading with zero mean and standard variance 8dB.
ϕ is the transmit antenna gain which is set to 15dBi, and h˜i and g˜k are the multipath fading which are modeled
as Rayleigh fading. In simulations, the propagation distances from MBS to all receivers is 60m, and the distances
from FBS to the MUs, IR and the ERs are 30m, 20m and 5m, respectively. For simplicity, we set the noise variances
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as σ2m = σ
2
I = σ
2
e,k = −100dBm/Hz, the EH threshold as Qk = Q = 15dBm, the target SINR for each MU as
Γm = Γ = −10dB, the energy conversion efficiency as ξ = 0.6.
Fig. 2 compares the average run times of the proposed algorithm and SDP with rank relaxation scheme versus the
number of eavesdroppers K under Pth = 40dBm. It can be observed that the proposed algorithm is much faster than
SDP via Gaussian randomization, which implies that proposed algorithm has a lower computational complexity. This
is owing to the fact that the SOCP is well-structured convex form which can be solved more efficiently.
For comparison, we consider three benchmark schemes, namely SDP via Gaussian randomization scheme, without
AN scheme (denoted as “w/o AN scheme”) and zero-forcing beamforming scheme [4] (denoted as “ZF scheme”).
Note that the Gaussian randomization method represents the global optimal scheme and the ZF scheme represents no
co-channel interference as well as the received signal is in the null space of eavesdropper. As can be seen from Fig. 3,
the proposed algorithm outperforms the w/o AN scheme and ZF scheme, which validates the introduced co-channel
interference is capable of improving the secrecy rate. In low transmit power, the secrecy rate of the proposed algorithm
is very close to that of the SDP via Gaussian randomization. Furthermore, the performance gap is below 0.25b/s/Hz
even in high transmit power region.
September 3, 2018 DRAFT
10
V. CONCLUSION
In this letter, we investigated secure beamforming design in a two-tier HetNet with SWIPT. Using SCA technique,
we reformulated the secrecy rate maximization problem into a series of SOC forms. Then, an iterative algorithm with
low-complexity was proposed to obtain the suboptimal solution. Numerical results have been provided to corroborate
the proposed scheme.
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